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"... it is surely laughable when the highest awards are showered on
those who promote the most gimcrack schemes to make themselves
rich, at least for a while. The geniuses who invented the pyramid of de-
rivatives at Long-Term Capital Management were awarded the Nobel
Prize for their cleverness, not long before the whole edifice came
crashing down with the financial community digging deep into its
pockets to prevent too much collateral damage. To every excess, there
comes a reaction."            Chris Patten**
A.  Introduction
Volatility regarding historical quotations is identical with the yearly statistical
standard deviation. It is considered a key indicator and factor for predicting of
underlying values and pricing.
The intention is to both to suggest an economic analysis and to provide some
inside experience regarding the market theory to accountants. They don't seem
to be aware of the model critics that are not reflected in guidance published by
international accounting authorities.
A.  I.  Not discussed
The intention is not to discuss the Black-Scholes model in detail. Eight key
disadvantages of the formula including mathematical, conceptional and eco-
nomic mistakes are summarized in Schroeder (2005). Further, this paper does-
n't make any statement about commercially published volatility indexes, regis-
tered as trademarks. The “real” volatility measured ex-post is used and dis-
cussed instead (backtesting).
The point is that the “real” volatility does not produce successful predictions,
nor does it make sense to “estimate” future volatility for that purpose.
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B.  Accounting Guidance
The key rules regarding stochastic valuation methods are described in FAS
123R (US) and IAS 39 (EU) and a few other related rules. Detailed advice on a
prescription level is provided by SAB 107 (US) and AG 82 (EU).
B.  I.  US and EU Accounting Rules
The complexity of FAS 123R e.g., its amendments and the corresponding
"Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB)" provided by the SEC and the cross refer-
encing is unbelievable. This enables heavy bureaucratic procedures!
SAB 1071 (SEC 3/2005) says (in response to Question 1 of Section C, Valua-
tion Methods) "This SAB includes interpretive guidance related to share-based
payment" and refers by name
• several times to the "Black-Scholes-Merton framework",
• sometimes to the lattice model2 and
• once to Engle-GARCH forecasting techniques.
IAS39 is more vague but treacherous: When mentioning 'implied volatility'
IAS39 is referring to the Black-Scholes model since implied volatility is com-
puted by using the B-S formula in revers.
B.  II.  Accounting Guidance
There is quite a discrepancy and a gap between the accounting rules and the
advanced financial market model discussion.
Fair value accounting (FVA) according to an ECB-definition3 is a valuation
principle that stipulates the use of either a market price, where it exists, or an
estimation of a market price as the present value of expected cash flows to es-
tablish the balance sheet value of financial instruments. SAB 107 more or less
suggest the use of the Black-Scholes "framework" to determine expected cash
                                                     
1 While the EU Application Guidances are part of the EU Rules and thus EU Law, SAB 107 are internal staff
recommendations and will not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations. However, a firm is well advised to
follow these SEC "suggestions".
2 By "lattice model" very probably the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein Binomial-Lattice model is meant. The binomial
distribution is approximated by the normal function and thus the lattice model is close to the B-S model.
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flows. Thus the fair value of a call4 is a complex5 function of spot, exercise
price, interest rate,6 time to maturity and volatility. The term "fair value" be-
came generally accepted in the 1980's. The original (and more correct) desig-
nation was "theoretical"7 value.
In IAS 39, Application Guidance (AG)82, the definite list of allowed B-S vari-
ables (without mentioning the B-S model by name!) is watered down by the
sentence: "The fair value of a financial instrument will be based on one or
more of the following [B-S ] factors.... (....and perhaps others.8).
There is guidance (and common economic sense) as to how these factors are
defined and how actual values should be gathered from the financial markets.
The discussion starts with the volatility.
The B-S "framework" requires that volatility stays constant, i. e., a current
volatility then could be a good predictor of future volatility. AG 82 recom-
mends taking as current volatility either the historic volatility of the last weeks
or the so-called implied volatility. SAB 107 says the length of the historic data
should be in relation and similar to the time to maturity.
The Engle-GARCH method mentioned in SAB 107 is a forecasting technique.
It may have its merites in analysis of history rows, however, it is uncertain that
it will hit the right future volatility figure in any individual forecasting situation
to come. That is a general problem and disadvantage: Forecasting can be veri-
fied only after the facts − ex post.
Two conditions were set in the 1973 publication by Black and Scholes: „. . .we
assumed. . . that over a finite time interval the returns on a common stock are
                                                                                                                                                                     
3 See http:// www.ecb.int/home/glossary/html/glossf.en.html
4 The so-called management options do not consider factors like management, success, quality etc. as influencing
parameters!
5 It is kind of presumptuous to speak of "Plain-Vanilla-Options" in the group of leveraged derivatives, computed
according to the B&S differential equation.
6 In Euroland typically Euribor- or Swap-Rates with a correspondent time to maturity
7 It would be worth a dissertation to analyze the "fair" phenomenon. Fair -of course - sounds better than "theo-
retical" for marketing purposes.
8 Emphasis by the author
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lognormally distributed. . .with constant mean and volatility. . .“9. It's a matter
of belief and tolerance whether financial data can be considered lognormally
distributed. But the volatility of financial rows is volatile itself.
To overcome these drawbacks quite a number of so-called advanced models
have been designed that still are based on the B-S framework. Instead of using
the set of B-S factors as such these approaches model volatility and interest
rate in particular. However, modeling the factors means implying further as-
sumptions about how these factors may behave and about their future value,
again meaning forecasting.
Another aspect is that the scenario of IAS valuation assumes a situation be-
tween professional businessmen (or businesswomen), i. e., "knowledgeable,
willing parties in an arm's length transaction," while in Germany it is basically
a situation between individual market participants  not necessarily profes-
sionals. There is different law regarding business between professionals. Buy-
ers of derivatives are made "knowledgeable" by signing a risk disclosure.
However, they still may be not aware that their shares may contain stochastic
priced "values- at-risk".
B.  III.  Sample Case
A most simple case  in line with the international rules  would be to
choose the B-S model, determine the set of B-S factors (assuming no "oth-
ers"!), estimate the future volatility by using one of the methods mentioned,
and "compute" the so-called fair value of a call.
This value could then become either a balance sheet item or an item in quar-
terly reports. It is then used instead of a market price not available for that par-
ticular item.
According to IAS, in a less simple case it could be any model using the set of
B-S factors including even "others" eventually. According to SAB it should be
a model related to the B-S framework.
                                                     
9 See Schroeder, G. Stochastic Pricing, p. 5 http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/wpawuwpif/0510019.htm
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Pure mathematical models like the exponential-hyperbolic equation sets are
excluded since they do not typically use the B-S factors that can somehow be
interpreted as economic factors.
B.  IV.  Objections
The following objections can be raised:
a. The choosen volatilityaside from the B-S formula and related questions
may be totally wrong in a particular valuation process. There is no possibility
for a proofonly ex post. The most popular interpretation is that the volatility
describes a one-year bandwidth of an underlying. In case of a normal distribu-
tion 68 percent of the cases would fall in that range, in case of lognormallity
only 61 percent. Paragraph  C.  II. "Quality of Bandwidth based Prediction"
analyses this kind of  prediction quality of important underlying values.
b. The fair value computed is a stochastic value, which means an expected
value based on an assumed probability distribution of the returns of the under-
lying value; mathematically, the present value of the total product of future
values and their probabilities. Referring to the German Lottery10 case, a corre-
sponding bandwidth around the expected value plus/minus volatility should be
accepted;  however, there is a difference: the 12,2 percent (6/49) theoretical
probability for fair lottery bullets being drawn is derived from the lottery rules
while the lognormal distribution of financial returns is just an assumption.
c. Within the B-S model there is a dependency of fair value and volatility. It
describes the percentage of the fair value from one percent change of volatility.
Vega11 (sometimes known as kappa) is the theoretical change of an option
price in case of a one-percent change in volatility. Vega is used for hedging
volatility risk. In this case it ranges from 8 to 23 percent independent of call or
put.
                                                                                                                                                                     
for a more detailed discussion.
10 Refer to Lottery Findings as of 2005, p. 14.
11 Vega is part of the "Greeks" despite it is not a Greek character. The "V" refers to volatility.
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The following table indicates the (ex post) measured average impact an in-
crease of volatility would have had on fair values of approximately 1000 ex-
change rate options "at-the-money" (Euro/Dollar, 1985 - 2005):
Figure 1: Measured Impact of Volatility Changes12
Volatility Call Put
1% 7% 12%
2% 13% 23%
3% 19% 33%
4% 25% 42%
While in theory Vega should be identical for calls and puts the empirical meas-
ure shows that the impact on puts is significantly higher.
In either aspect, as long as B-S-type models are used volatility is the most im-
portant factor.
d. Details of the valuation model used in an individual case don't require pub-
lishing. The accounting firm, the tax inspector and a rating agency involved
may be the only ones who know. And (of course) "knowledgeable, willing par-
ties in an arm's length"13 situation may ask for the valuation model and how the
factors are used. All others are barred from this insight.
Summarizing these arguments, it must be said: there is no proven technique to
predict a future volatility (volatility is rather volatile itself), there is no reason
that the volatility should influence the price of an option, and the B-S model
should not be used because its prerequisites do not meet reality.
A valuation model based on fair value is pure fiction. A changing swell doesn't
change the depth of the sea.
B.  V.  Does Volatility Say Anything about the Future?
Yes. Volatility of stock indexes is higher than foreign exchange volatilities,
which are around 10 percent (among the dollar, euro, yen and British pound).
                                                     
12 See Schroeder, G., Stochastic Pricing, 2005, p. 6
13 A term used in IAS 39, AG70
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Volatilities between the euro and the Swiss frank are around 5 percent, be-
tween the euro and the Danish krone is around 2 percent. But they are admin-
istered, "smoothed"; Denmark, e.g., has to maintain that bandwidth for the last
two years as long as it wants to opt for the euro14.
Volatilities of stock indexes are on the other hand around 15 percent or more.
Looking at the history volatilities there have been minima and maxima, aver-
ages, etc., which are quite stable. This scenario may be valid for a couple of
years.
The volatility of volatilities themselves is typically similar to that of underlying
values.
C.  Objections based on Basic Statistics
C.  I.  Standard Deviation Vs Bandwidth
In case of exchange quotations The standard deviation (sigma) is a statistical
measure of the spread of the courses or their returns in a diagram. If a variable
follows a normal probability distribution 68 (not 100!) out of any 100 ran-
domly selected cases or quotations should fall within the range of mean
plus/minus sigma (Fahrmeir, 2001, p. 92). Thus the yield of positive predic-
tions is also a measure for the prediction quality of volatility. Any other prob-
ability function has another quota of hits.
The broader the range, i. e., the greater the volatility, the more hits can be
countedhowever, the less interesting for predictions.
Since the future development (and the probability distribution) of an underly-
ing value is unknown, its standard deviation  observed in the past  is often
used to determine a future bandwidth. If done day by day one can draw a for-
casting channel based on all individual bandwidth figures, though it is still an
assumption or belief. It is different from Lotto or dice where physical and
mathematical rationales suggest a certain probability in the long run.
                                                     
14 This may not happen either since the portait of Magrethe II is not allowed on the euro frontside.
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Most of the financial market models  again  assume rather the lognormal
distibution of returns. This distribution has a specific property: there is the
same probability to double or to halve a course,15 etc.
When forecasting underlyings the last quotation (S or spot) is taken as the
mean since this is the "best predictor" for any future course development. For
both present and future it is not possible to be sure about the standard devia-
tion. Since the future standard deviation is unknown, the implied volatility
(ivol) is often taken as an estimator instead. Thus the positive end of the band-
width is assumed to be spot x (1+ ivol ). In this case the negative end is defined
by last )1/( ivolspot +  (Green Line)
Figure 2: Volatility based DAX Predictition
Thus the lognormal bandwidth is smaller than )1(* ivolspot ± and less than 68
out of any 100 randomly selected cases, the higher the volatility the more quo-
tations will fall within the bandwidth. In case of 15 (30) percent volatility it is
64 (62) hits, etc.
Counting 3263 daily DAX quotations the ex post volatility was used to deter-
mine the bandwidth for each day over 252 exchange days, representing an av-
erage year, or 21 bank days (for a month). This determines a forecast channel.
                                                     
15 Economically this has some rational. Courses cannot become negative. In absolute terms: Less market power is
required to bring courses 5 points up than 5 points down.
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Figure 1 suggests that the forecast channel was somewhat "behind", for exam-
ple during '95 through '97. In this diagram the forecast and the future course
(bold blue line) are related to the day of forecast. It would be plausible also to
relate it to the time of prediction (actual course versus what was predicted?).
However, that would not change the graph. It would shift the x-scale only. An
explanation for the volatility lag could be that the course moves must happen
first to "make" the volatility. For similar figures covering DJ, FTSE, USD/EUR
please refer to page 18.
C.  II.  Quality of Bandwidth based Prediction
Some leading indexes, the Euro-Dollar relation and a heavy traded stock are
taken as examples:
Figure 3: Prediction Precision
Volatility 1 Year in Days Hits as % from to Average Volatility
DAX ex post 252 46% 1992 2004 18%
lognorm corrected 252 44% 1992 2004 18%
FTSE ex post 252 53% 1984 2004 16%
DJ ex post 252 54% 1987 2004 14%
Euro in USD e.p. 365 47% 1999 2005 10%
Telekom ex post 252 78% 1996 2004 42%
The closer the number of hits comes to a "50/50" result, the more prediction
validity becomes meaningless. As far as all hits making less than 68 percent,
this also proves that these probability distributions deviate from normal! The
Telekom yield is an excemption: The 78 percent is also a deviation from nor-
mal standards, however positive. This is a result of the high level of overall
volatility during the full sample period.
C.  III.  Predicting a Single versus a Value Bandwidth
It is insufficient for reports or balance sheets to declare the bandwidth of a
value (value-at-risk approach). Single values are achieved by multiplying prob-
abilities with the scale of potential value. The sum of the products is called the
expected value. To identify and to quantify risks arising from market and sto-
chastic uncertainties, levels of volatility are determined in risk statements.
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C.  IV.  Expected Courses Based on Options
Besides volatility one could analyze option prices that at least theoretically
contain individual course expectations to cover the compound interest for the
option. Or one could follow auto correlative structures of historical and present
quotations.
Instead of evaluating option prices via the volatility for putative future share
values one could compute the accrued option price including transaction costs
at time due.
         Figure 4: Option-based Prediction
The boundaries of the white
channel represent the break-
even line of calls and puts, re-
spectively.
In the event the course reaches
the top grey area it would be
profitable for calls (the bottom
grey area for puts). The white
area indicates course developments without profits for either puts or calls.
The bold black line in the middle represents the expected course computed out
of call and put expectations weighted by their price. There are different
weighting techniques possible, each option buyer bets on a certain course  at
least when he or she operates "rationally." Options with different exercise
prices but the same due date could be combined easily. Thus all option courses
for the same underlying and the same due date can be weighted by the courses.
More representative weighting would include the inventory of options of major
brokerage banks or, even better, all quotes of the total trade of options of all
option exchanges in place including OTC. That would include those market
participants who are tracking the particular course but decide not to react but
are at least on "keep" or "hold". This would more or less represent the value
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expectations of the retail market.
When emitters cover their risks caused by any imbalance between call- and put-
type orders then they may influence stock courses also. Thus, proprietary posi-
tions should be included also, especially in the case of micro hedging or "naked
sales", when they foil trends assumed by the market originally for the options
or the underlying values.
 It is quite questionable whether the retail market and the emitters really care
about the correct and most probable future values. They rely on models to de-
termine the option prices based on current market data. In approximately 90
percent of the cases it is the Black-Scholes model.
C.  V.  Expected Courses Based on Pure Volatility
The future value of the expected underlying value based on lognormal distrib-
uted returns (see page 10f.) deducted by the exercise price and discounted
could be taken for an aproximation of a call price also. In this case there are no
approximations of put prices since there are no negative lognormal expecta-
tions. This would still allow underlying values with lognormal returns to reach
a level making puts profitable during the time before expiration .
C.  VI.  Lognormality
Assuming that future returns follow a lognormal density distribution the spread
of future courses can be shown as in the following figure. The volatility for the
time from January 2006 until December 2007 has to be estimated. Approxi-
mately 15 percent (per year) is assumed.
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Figure 5: The Concept
The time of prediction is the end of January 2006, with the most recent quota-
tion of about 5800. This is  assuming an effective market  the most prob-
able quotation for Dec. 07 also. Thus the peak of the density curve is at 5800
with a maximum probability of 18 percent (w/o scale). Applying the density
curve over the DAX-scale puts the "expected" value of the DAX at around
6000. Seventy-three of 100 cases might fall within the range of 5200 through
6400, which is quite vague and still leaves 27 cases outside. The expected per-
formance is between 1 and 2 percent per year (depending on the volatility),
which is precious little for a blue chip index. It is only because of the mild
skewness of the density curve, there is no economic reason. More precisely a
variable X can be named lognormal with parameters mean and square sigma, in
short, X ~ LN (mean, sigma^2) as long as Y = Ln (X) is distributed normally.
The expected value of X is then:
E(X) = EXP(mean + 0,5* sigma^2) = EXP(mean + 0,5* variance)
The theoretical dependency of returns (y-axis) on the long term average vola-
tility (x-axis) is shown in the following diagram:
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Figure 6: LN Returns versus Volatility
The low level of
theoretical returns  e.g.
the DJ around 3 percent -
does not reflect market
reality: the Dow Jones
and FTSE indexes over
20 years have, despite
lower volatility
demonstrated higher returns than the DAX  and all of them around 10 per-
cent or more. Otherwise, in balanced foreign exchange markets currencies
should have no returns.
C.  VII.  Scaling of Volatility
Homoscedastic (somehow constant) volatility allows scaling. Volatility if not
specified otherwise is meant for a year that could be 365 calendar days, ap-
proximately 252bank days16, 52 weeks or 12 months. Using bank days one
could draw the following lines, the volatility measured ex post between Aug.
1993 and 1994 of about 18 percent was scaled (black) for each day using the
number of remaining days in each case. 17
                                                     
16 The precise average figure of a given sample can be determinded by comparing the calendar difference with
the number of quotations available.
17 square root (252/ sample days) * 18,4%
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       Figure 7: Homoscedasticity
Homoscedasticity is given only if the volatility follows the scaling equation
(black lines) strictly - for the first quarter (of this year) the volatility reaches
half of the yearly volatility, etc.
C.  VIII.  Volatility versus Black-Scholes Model
The Black-Scholes model has a different approach: the most probable course
is, for whatever reason, assumed intrinsically to be the exercise price. There-
fore it is similar to the previous concept except for options strictly "at the
money". This is, by the way, the explanation for the "smile" mystery. There is
no economic reason to consider the exercise price as the most probable ex-
pected future course. The exercise price is arbitrarily set by the emittor. Opti-
mists and pessimists can agree on the same exercise price. They may differ on
their individual estimate of the future value of an underlying and the level of
risk they want to take and still remain "rational" investors according to the Ef-
ficient Market Hypothesis (EMH).
C.  IX.  Lottery Findings as of 2005
The German lottery drawings since 1955 are well documented. Considering
4340 drawings since October 1955 (including Wednesday lottery since No-
vember 1963), the expected value for a particular number should be 4340 * 6 /
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49 = 531. In reality however, number 13 was drawn only 471 times whereas 38
was drawn 582 times. Thus even after quite a number of drawings during 50
years there are still deviations, −11 to +10 percent, from the expected. Simula-
tions using mathematical random numbers show similar results. This is statisti-
cally in line with degrees of freedom within random systems and there is no
reason to question the fairness of the settings.
D.  Consequences
All of these appendages are in conflict with the Efficient Market Hypothesis
(EMH) that assumes that all relevant information is worked up in a market
considered to be "efficient".
The Brownian Motion and financial markets exhibits differ. The course stands
for a coordinate of the particle under the microscope, whose stochastic trem-
bling corresponds to constant course motions. But orders are of different size,
or equivalently large and also not necessarily independent from each other like
molecules of the liquid or their impulses. Orders enter underlying markets
without doubt directly into the price computation of the market model. A trans-
acted order is no longer alterable during an auction, even by a "provisional or-
der". Others compare the molecules with the constant information flow, to
which the financial markets are exposed. This could apply to derivatives mar-
kets, where the emittent can work up to the "quotation". Also, information has
a very different effective force, it is usually exogenous and interactive. It would
correspond to the closed model of the Brownian Motion where one inclines the
microscope or applies heat with a candle under the carrier glass.
Apart from higher temperature, and smaller weight of the particle, viscosity
causes increased diffusion. In order to minimize errors by superelevated tem-
perature, auction volumes should not be set too small. Processing speed of or-
ders to be worked on and the quest for real-time processing rank second com-
pared to fair pricing.
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Basically it is like reading tea leaves. Empirical, experimental analysis suggests
that volatility describes a rather broad prediction channel that contains ap-
proximately 50 percent of future courses of a sample of thousands. In the end it
should be left to the markets to invest money into individual assessed risks in-
stead of relying on pricing by market makers setting taxed prices based on
questionable formulas.
The IASB, the FASB, as well as the SEC don't seem to be fully aware of the
model critics or do not consider them in the rules properly. Fair prices related
to the Black-Scholes-Merton framework are by no means equivalent to market
prices.
Summary
There is no economic reason that future values should depend on today's vola-
tility. It's a belief, a kind of intelligent design of market models. Reported fig-
ures should be closer to market decisions. Predictions  pricing of derivatives
means predicting  remain uncertain. Using it for evaluations is a field of
"creative" accounting. The international accounting rules are no guidance. They
are misleading.
Zusammenfassung
Die Kritik an dem Modell von Black und Scholes ist nicht  neu. Das Modell
war in der Theorie der Finanzmärkte im Begriff, das Attribut "historisch" zu-
bekommen. Neu ist, daß sich das Modell verselbständigt hat und nun unreflek-
tiert in Bilanzierungsstandards und Gesetzens seinen Niederschlag gefunden
hat.
Es gibt keine ökonomische Beziehung zwischen dem künftigen Wert einer
Notierung und seiner aktuellen Volatilität. Stochastische (Tax-) Preise haben
bei Derivaten zu wenig Marktnähe.
Prognosen - das sind Bewertungen von Derivaten - bleiben ungewiß. Nutzt
man sie dennoch für Bilanzwerte, ist das ein Feld für kreative Bilanzpolitik.
    Volatility Says Less about the future than Accounting Rules Suggest                17    
Working Paper Financial Market Models     Nov. 2006
References
Heston, SL "A closed-form solution for options with stochastic volatility with
applications to bond and currency options" Review of Financial Studies, 1993;
6:327-343
Lo, AW, AC MacKinlay: "Stock market prices do not follow random walks:
evidence from a simple specification test", Review of Financial Studies, 1988;
1:41-66
Pape, Ulrich / Merk, Andreas: "Zur Angemessenheit von Optionspreisen - Er-
gebnisse einer empirischen Überprüfung des Black/ScholeS Modells" ESCP-
EAP-Workingpaper, (2003), p. 8 and 14, 15...
Schroeder, G., Stochastic Pricing, 2005, pp.5-9
Schroeder, G., Empirische Beiträge zur Optionsbewertung mit Analysen zu
Black und Scholes u.a.(ZfB) © BWL. Verlag Dr. Th. Gabler GmbH, Wies-
baden (Including financial market model systematics). Received by the ZfB:
June 6, 1998, published in ZfB supplement 2/98 (Jan. 99)
Schroeder, G., Entwicklungen bei Kapitalmarktmodellen (ZfB), Heft 2001/9
als PDF-Datei © Bwl. Verlag Dr. Th. Gabler GmbH, Wiesbaden, received by
the ZfB: 26. October 2000, published in ZfB H.9 2001, p1091-1105
Schroeder, G., Bookreview: Thomas Kaiser: "Volatiltätsprognose mit Faktor-
GARCH-Modellen. (ZfB 98) (GARCH theory review)
Publications regarding financial market models and further subject refer-
ences are provided by Economics Working Paper Archive EconWPA, series
International Finance, and numbers 0510019, 05120003 and 0510024
Data Sources: Courtesy: Yahoo Finance + Oanda COM
(http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory)
    Volatility Says Less about the future than Accounting Rules Suggest                18    
Working Paper Financial Market Models     Nov. 2006
References (and evaluations) made by the SEC18:
"There are many other options pricing models available. Good books on the
topic are Hull, "Options, Futures, and other Derivatives" [now 6th. Ed., 2005]
(Prentice Hall), and Natenberg, "Option Volatility and Pricing" (Irwin).
S. Huddart, “Patterns of stock option exercise in the United States,” in: J. Car-
penter and D. Yermack, Eds. Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value:
Theory and Evidence (Kluwer, Boston, MA, 1999), pp. 115-142.38
E.  Attachments
E.  I.  US and EU Accounting Rules (Excerpts)
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) 17 CFR PART 211
[Release no. x ] SAB (Staff Accounting Bulletin) 107, 64 pages. The inter-
pretations in this staff accounting bulletin express views of the (SEC) staff re-
garding the interaction between Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
Statement No. 123 (revised 2004) reg. valuation methods including assump-
tions such as expected volatility and expected term, March 29, 2005.
"...a company should select a valuation technique or model that
(a) is applied in a manner consistent with the fair value measurement
objective and other requirements of Statement 123R19,
(b) is based on established principles of financial economic theory and
generally applied in that field and
(c) reflects all substantive characteristics of the instrument."
The phrase "the (SEC-) staff believes..." is used very often
The EC Regulation No 1606/2002 dated July 19, determines that international
accounting standard (IAS) are developed by a IAS Committee (IASC), now
Board (IASB), prescribed and published then by the European Union as obli-
                                                     
18 and not necessarily by the author
19 This guidance is related to valuations of company’s share options.
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gatorily rules. SAB 107 seems to be the US pendant to the "Application Guid-
ance" (74 - 82), amendments of IAS 39..." an integral part of the Standard."   
When comparing IAS 39 with SAB 107 the latter seems to be more specific.
AG82. An appropriate technique for estimating the fair value of a particular
financial instrument would incorporate observable market data about the mar-
ket conditions and other factors that are likely to affect the instrument’s fair
value. The fair value of a financial instrument will be based on one or more of
the following factors (and perhaps others).
(a) The time value of money (ie interest at the basic or risk-free rate). Basic
interest rates can usually be derived from observable government bond prices
and are often quoted in financial publications. These rates typically vary with
the expected dates of the projected cash flows along a yield curve of interest
rates for different time horizons. For practical reasons, an entity may use an
well-accepted and readily observable general rate, such as LIBOR or a swap
rate, as the benchmark rate. (Because a rate such as LIBOR is not the risk-free
interest rate,  the credit risk adjustment appropriate to the particular financial
instrument is determined on the basis of its credit risk in relation to the credit
risk in this benchmark rate.) In some countries, the central government’s bonds
may carry a significant credit risk and may not provide a stable benchmark
basic interest rate for instruments denominated in that currency. Some entities
in these countries may have a better credit standing and a lower borrowing
rate than the central government. In such a case, basic interest rates may be
more appropriately determined by reference to interest rates for the highest
rated corporate bonds issued in the currency of that jurisdiction.
(b) Credit risk. The effect on fair value of credit risk (ie the premium over the
basic interest rate for credit risk) may be derived from observable market
prices for traded instruments of different credit quality or from observable in-
terest rates charged by lenders for loans of various credit ratings.
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(c) Foreign currency exchange prices. Active currency exchange markets exist
for most major currencies, and prices are quoted daily in financial publica-
tions.
(d) Commodity prices. There are observable market prices for many commodi-
ties.
(e) Equity prices. Prices (and indexes of prices) of traded equity instruments
are readily observable in some markets. Present value based techniques may
be used to estimate the current market price of equity instruments for which
there are no observable prices.
(f) Volatility (ie magnitude of future changes in price of the financial in-
strument or other item). Measures of the volatility of actively traded items
can normally be reasonably estimated on the basis of historical market data
or by using volatilities implied in current market prices.
(g) Prepayment risk and surrender risk. Expected prepayment patterns forfi-
nancial assets and expected surrender patterns for financial liabilities can be
estimated on the basis of historical data. (The fair value of a financial liability
that can be surrendered by the counterparty cannot be less than the present
value of the surrender amount...)
E.  II.  Bandwidth analysis of Dow Jones, FTSE, and Euro/Dollar Rate
Additional analysis furnishing chaper C.  II. , Quality of Bandwidth based Pre-
diction. The expected bandwidth of indexes and FTSE as well as the
Euro/Dollar exchange rate suggests that the forecast channel be kind of "be-
hind" like the DAX-bandwidth-channel.  
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  Figure 8: Dow Jones
The maverick in 87 shows that forecasts in troubled times do have a sign, plus
or minus. The expectations after October 87 were negative. Nobody would
have seen a 5000 horizon by then.
Figure 9: FTSE
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Figure 10: Foreign Exchange (Dollar/Euro)
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